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PATCHWORK METROPOLIS: FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE AND 
URBAN DECLINE IN GREATER ST. LOUIS 
COLIN GORDON* 
In the early 1960s, in the wake of yet another failure to stitch St. Louis 
County (the “County”) and St. Louis City (the “City”) back together again, 
regional planners returned to their drafting tables. The task, given their 
inability to overcome the parochial defense of “home rule” in St. Louis County 
(already a crazy quilt of eighty-six incorporated municipalities), was to redraw 
the region’s boundaries in such a way as to preserve the apparent virtues of 
local governance while overcoming the destructive fragmentation that came 
with it.1 As a planning exercise, this task had two overarching goals. The first 
was to breach the boundary between the City and the County—a line which 
postwar planners characterized as a “Berlin Wall” between a declining city and 
its affluent suburbs, and which fair housing advocates described as a “steel 
ring” or “white noose” of segregation.2 The second was to even out the scale 
and responsibility of the region’s municipalities—which ranged from the City 
of St. Louis, with a 1960 population of 750,000, to the St. Louis County suburb 
of Champ, incorporated in 1959 with a population of 14.3 
 
* Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, University of Iowa. 
 1. F. William Human, Jr., The Borough Plan – An Opposition View, 9 ST. LOUIS BAR J. 19, 
22–23, 25 (1962); E. TERRENCE JONES, FRAGMENTED BY DESIGN: WHY ST. LOUIS HAS SO 
MANY GOVERNMENTS 79–82 (2000); St. Louis League of Women Voters, Some Facts about the 
Borough Plan that the Sponsors Do Not Want to Mention Publicly (Apr. 4, 1962) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the St. Louis League of Women Voters Records, folder 1163 (sl530), 
the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the University of Missouri–St. Louis). 
 2. See WILLIAM KOTTMEYER, ST. LOUIS BD. OF EDUC., A TALE OF TWO CITIES (1968), 
excerpted in DANIEL SCHAFLY, 28 YEARS ON THE ST. LOUIS SCHOOL BOARD (1995) (“Berlin 
Wall” analogue); Patricia Jansen Doyle, St. Louis: City with the Blues, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 15, 
1969, at 90; Appellant’s Abstract of the Record at 9, Dolan v. Richardson, 181 S.W.2d 997 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1944) (No. 26,502) (“ring of steel”); HUMAN DEV. CORP. OF ST. LOUIS, RESEARCH 
DEP’T, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POVERTY: ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREA: CAUSES, 
CONDITIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (1971) (“white noose”). 
 3. Harland Bartholomew and Associates, City Planners, A Report upon Development and 
Administration of the Village of Champ, Missouri 4–5 (May, 1962) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file in the Harland Bartholomew Papers, vol. 15, ser. 2 (Blue) at Washington University); see also 
Laura Higgins, The Champ, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, http://www.riverfronttimes.com/ 
content/printVersion/110097/. 
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One of the early sketches in this exercise, however fanciful and infeasible, 
neatly captured the logic and challenge of local governance. It redrew the 
municipal boundaries on the Missouri side as a series of wedges—their points 
anchored on the riverfront, their boundaries widening as they moved west 
across the City, the City-County border, and out to the western edge of St. 
Louis County.4 Each municipality in this division of the region’s population, 
assets, and burdens would include a small portion of the deindustrializing 
riverfront and the City’s older commercial core, a slice of older residential 
stock in the central and western reaches of the City, a small band of inner 
suburbs (much of which more closely resembled the City in its land use and 
demographics), a stretch of newer suburban development, and a frontier of 
lightly developed property at its western edge. 
The genius of the proposal, of course, was this: it gave a cursory nod to the 
desire for local governance and home rule, but then forced each of the new 
municipal units to think like a region. It made it impossible for municipal 
fragments to practice the art, as Myron Orfield puts it, “of skimming the cream 
from metropolitan growth while accepting as few metropolitan responsibilities 
as possible.”5 Each of you, it suggested, have some rich residents and some 
poor residents, some property whose tax value is increasing and some property 
whose value is languishing, some pockets of commercial growth and some 
pockets of blight and unemployment, and some prospects for new development 
and some pressing demands for redevelopment. How would you zone such a 
municipality? How would you pay for its schools and other public goods and 
services? How would you approach the challenges of transportation or 
economic development? 
I.  THE DIVORCE: 1876 AND ALL THAT 
The initial separation of St. Louis City and St. Louis County anticipated 
none of this. In the wake of the Civil War, St. Louis interests were weary of 
both laundering the most mundane details of local government through 
Jefferson City6 and paying for the privilege of duplicative County services.7 At 
its 1876 constitutional convention, Missouri formalized its rules for local 
governance—setting local debt limits, proscribing the passage of “special 
 
 4. Don Phares, Planning for Regional Governance in the St. Louis Area: The Contexts, the 
Plans, the Outcomes, in ST. LOUIS PLANS: THE IDEAL AND THE REAL ST. LOUIS 55, 66–67 (Mark 
Tranel ed., 2007). 
 5. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND 
STABILITY 5–6 (1998). 
 6. Before home rule, every new tax, levy, or sewer line was an act of the state legislature. 
Truman Port Young, The Scheme of City and County Governments in St. Louis – Its History and 
Purposes, 6 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 97, 98 (1912). 
 7. Id. at 98–99. 
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laws” in the statehouse, establishing a classification system for villages, towns, 
and cities, and giving cities over a certain population threshold (initially set so 
as just to include St. Louis) the option of adopting a charter of self-
government.8 In response, St. Louis City pushed its boundaries west, to their 
current location, and opted for formal separation from St. Louis County.9 
Because the City was no longer located in a county, the new charter, in effect, 
made it its own county. This resulted in a hybrid government with both 
municipal (e.g., police power) and county (e.g., property assessment and 
courts) responsibilities.10 
At the time, separation from the County made sense for City interests, and 
details of the 1876 agreement were crafted and implemented largely at their 
behest.11 But over the ensuing decades, three things happened to alter the terms 
of this deal. First, the metropolitan area grew and soon pressed against the 
western border established in 1876.12 In order to sustain the City as a natural 
unit of government, its reach coterminous with that of its population and its 
economic base, the logical step was to add new territory by annexation. But 
this option was blocked by the hard line drawn between St. Louis City and St. 
Louis County in 1876, and by the state boundary between the City and its 
industrial suburbs in the Illinois side of the Mississippi.13 As a result, urban 
growth continued, but beyond the regulatory reach of the City.14 Second, the 
right of self-government that had been extended to St. Louis alone in 1876 was 
soon made available to almost all comers.15 By 1945 home rule had become an 
option for any Missouri city with over 5,000 residents and any county with 
assessed property value exceeding $4.5 million.16 And third, the African 
 
 8. JONES, supra note 1, at 3–9; Young, supra note 6, at 100; U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-127, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND JUDICIAL CLARIFICATION 41 (1993). 
 9.  Young, supra note 6, at 101. 
 10. E. Terrence Jones & Don Phares, Missouri, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE 
HANDBOOK 241, 241–43 (2001); St. Louis League of Women Voters, Structure of Government in 
St. Louis, Missouri (May 4, 1953) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the St. Louis League of 
Women Voters Records (sl234) box 18:98 in the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the 
University of Missouri–St. Louis). 
 11. Young, supra note 6, at 103. 
 12. City Plan Comm’n, St. Louis, Missouri, Subdivision of Land in St. Louis by Decades, 
Jan. 1967, http://library.wustl.edu/vlib/mrdc/composite.html. For the pace of development within 
the 1876 boundaries, see the Wayman Map, which map documents each subdivision, addition, 
and re-subdivision of property made in the City of St. Louis after 1816). 
 13. JONES, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 14. See COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN 
CITY 129 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008). 
 15. Henry J. Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U. L.Q. 385, 385 
(1953). 
 16. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19. 
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American population of St. Louis grew rapidly, more than doubling from 1890 
to 1920 and more than doubling again from 1920 to 1950.17 
What all of this meant, in effect, was that the temporary advantage 
afforded to the City of St. Louis in 1876 soon became a grotesque liability. 
Natural urban growth, changing state law, and changing demographics 
combined to give surrounding communities, especially those multiplying west 
of the city limits, both the opportunity and the incentive to poach St. Louis of 
its wealth and resources.18 Because the City could not expand, new residential 
development to the west fell under other jurisdictions, or created their own.19 
The central planning goal of these private developments and new 
municipalities, in turn, was to insulate themselves from local costs or threats or 
burdens—especially industrial land use, multifamily housing, and African 
American occupancy.20 The damage here was done not by the divorce of 1876, 
but by the offspring of that divorce: the extension of home rule to a hundred-
odd municipal fragments that were—in purpose and in practice—predatory, 
insular, and deeply discriminatory.21 
II.  THE EMANCIPATED CITY? MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
This is an uncomfortably dismal assessment. An abiding faith in home 
rule, after all, is deeply rooted in American political theory and experience, 
running virtually unbroken from de Tocqueville22 to the devolutionary politics 
of recent years, and across the political spectrum from the New Left's 
participatory ideals to the New Right's antistatist focus on community and 
family.23 “Local government comes closer to the people than any other,” as 
one municipal reformer argued in the early twentieth century. 
It is basic. It is through its exercise that men acquire their political schooling 
and become familiar with what democratic institutions mean.24 
 
 17. In 1920, the African American population of St. Louis was about 70,000, or 10% of the 
City’s total population; in 1950 it was over 150,000, almost 20% of the City’s population. Bureau 
of Census, county totals via the Historical Census Browser. Retrieved May 24, 2014, from the 
University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center: http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/ 
collections/stats/histcensus/index.html. 
 18. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 129–131. 
 19. See id. at 39–41. 
 20. See id. at 3–38. 
 21. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 45–46. 
 22. ALEXANDER DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62 (Phillips Bradley & 
Vintage Books eds., 1945) (“The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly 
natural that, wherever a number of men are collected, it seems to constitute itself.”). 
 23. WILLIAM HUFF, THE TEA PARTY MANIFESTO 954 (2010). 
 24. WALTER TALLMADGE ARNDT, THE EMANCIPATION OF THE AMERICAN CITY 16 (1917). 
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In the American setting, the politics of home rule have revolved around a 
particular legal and historical problem: the task of governing cities.25 The issue 
arose first in the late nineteenth century, as rapid urbanization outstripped the 
willingness and ability of state legislatures to meet or manage municipal 
demands.26 And it reemerged in the context of both the “urban crises” of the 
1960s and 1970s and the subsequent devolution of federal responsibilities.27 In 
each era, the call for home rule was animated by the simultaneously 
philosophical and practical convictions that state legislatures were at best 
indifferent and at worst hostile to urban concerns, that urban citizens were 
underrepresented and overtaxed, and that cities lacked the authority or 
resources to solve their own problems.28 Effective home rule, as urban 
reformers have argued now for well over a century, is the key to both 
managerial efficiency and civic participation in the modern metropolis.29 
Yet there is something troubling in this picture. In most settings, the 
victory of home rule was followed not by a golden age of local democracy but 
by a precipitous collapse in civic participation, especially voting in local 
elections.30 There is little evidence that states with strong home rule provisions 
boast better urban governance, and indeed most that fit that description have 
devoted a great deal of attention to mopping up after abuses of local 
autonomy.31 And, despite decades of experience with home rule, most 
American cities remain plagued by a seemingly “iron law” of urban decay. 
Rising incomes breed suburbanization.32 Suburbanization robs inner cities of 
their tax base.33 Inner city concentrations of poverty widen gaps between urban 
residents and substantive economic opportunities, and between suburban 
 
 25. Kenneth Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 268, 268–73 (1968). 
 26. HORACE DEMING, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES 26–33 (1909). 
 27. Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J. L. & POL. 1, 26 
(2006). 
 28. See DEMING, supra note 26, at 26–27. 
 29. The most elaborate, and in many respects romantic, statement of this position is Gerald 
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1119–20 (1980). 
 30.  See Samuel Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive 
Era, 55 PAC. NW. Q. 157, 163 (1964). 
 31. Such state measures include limits on local debt or tax levies, mandatory audits of local 
accounts, and “open-bidding” guidelines. See Lyle Schaller, Home Rule—A Critical Appraisal, 
76 POL. SCI. Q. 402, 413 (1961). 
 32. DANIEL LURIA & JOEL ROGERS, METRO FUTURES: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS FOR CITIES 
AND THEIR SUBURBS 3 (1999). 
 33. Id. 
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residents and urban concerns.34 All of this encourages more flight, not only 
from the metropolitan core, but from decaying inner suburbs as well.35 
Why is home rule not all it is cracked up to be? The answer lies partly in 
the history of the home rule movement. The Progressive Era campaign for 
home rule was deeply compromised by the divergent motives of reformers, 
determined to wrestle control of the city, in equal part, from indifferent state 
legislatures and from working-class political organizations.36 And the answer 
lies partly in the history of the modern American city. Patterns of urban growth 
and decay have meant that home rule is less a weapon wielded by cities against 
other levels of government than it is a weapon wielded by some fractions of 
the modern city (especially incorporated suburbs) against both central cities 
and broader metropolitan interests.37 
Urbanization in the latter half of the nineteenth century posed a practical 
and legal riddle. The Constitution—animated in equal parts by distrust of 
central authority, anxieties about mob rule, and the conflation of agrarian 
property and citizenship—vested “original sovereignty” in the states and 
remained silent on the political status of cities.38 The political autonomy of the 
emerging American city was determined less by Jeffersonian ideals of self-
government or free association than by Madisonian fears of political faction or 
fragmentation.39 By law and practice, the city was a quasi-public corporation, 
subject to regulation by the state but without “state” powers itself.40 “Localities 
could hardly call their souls their own,” as one champion of home rule wrote, 
“so tight were the fetters that bound them.”41 
These fetters were expressed most clearly by John Dillon, an Iowa 
Supreme Court justice and authority on municipal law. “Dillon’s Rule” was 
first expressed in the 1868 decision Clinton v. Cedar Rapids42 and enshrined in 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 3-4; ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
 36. Hays, supra note 30, at 166; JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE 
LIBERAL STATE: 1900–1918, at 92–116 (1968). 
 37. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 12 (1985). 
 38. Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Oregon’s Home Rule 
Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L. REV. 909, 912–13 (1997). 
 39. For doubts about the practicality or propriety of local government, see JOHN STUART 
MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 317–340 (The Floating Press 
2009). 
 40. See Cumfer, supra note 38 (describing the legal status of the nineteenth century city); 
Frug, supra note 29, at 1098. 
 41. RODNEY MOTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA’S CITIES 11 (1949). 
 42. Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 474–80 (1868). 
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the justice’s 1872 publication, Treatise on the Law of Municipal 
Corporations,43 which held that 
a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and 
not others: First, those powers granted in express words; second, those 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; 
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared object and 
purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient but indispensable. Any fair, 
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by 
the courts against the corporation and the power is denied.44 
Cities, quite simply, had few substantive powers of self-government. They 
could not levy taxes, go into debt, pursue local improvements, change the 
structure of local government, or (in many cases) even hire and pay their own 
staff without the express consent of state legislatures.45 
As cities and the demands of governing them grew, Dillon’s Rule 
frustrated municipal officials and state legislators alike.46 Through the Gilded 
Age, by reformers’ estimates, between one-third and one-half of a state 
legislature’s attention was devoted to bills of a purely local character and 
impact.47 Cities and their citizens had to run to the state for even the most 
trivial concerns, and state legislatures spent much of each session acting as 
“spasmodic city councils.”48 Even as more recently drafted state constitutions 
(particularly in the Midwest) barred such “special legislation,” municipal 
management often masqueraded as “general” laws.49 In 1868, for example, the 
Ohio legislature adopted the following law, mentioning no city by name but 
transparently aimed at just one—Cincinnati: 
The City Council of any city of the first class having a population exceeding 
150,000 shall have the power to issue the bonds of such city in any sum not 
exceeding $150,000, to be used for the purpose of completing the Eggleston 
Avenue sewer.50 
 
 43. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 116 (1872). 
 44. William Casella, A Century of Home Rule, 64 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 441, 441–42 (1975). 
 45. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local Government Law, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990); DALE KRANE, PLATON RIGOS & MELVIN HILL, HOME RULE IN 
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 9–10 (2001); ARNDT, supra note 24, at 240–259; FRANK 
J. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATION 50–51 (1895). 
 46. See Cumfer, supra note 38; Frug, supra note 29, at 1116; KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, supra 
note 45. 
 47. ARNDT, supra note 24, at 240–59; GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 50–51. 
 48. MOTT, supra note 41, at 11. 
 49. Briffault, supra note 45, at 9; Casella, supra note 44. 
 50. GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 16; MOTT, supra note 41, at 6–7, 11; Schaller, supra note 
31, at 403. 
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The problem with such laws was not just their awkwardness but the conviction, 
widely held by urban politicos and political reformers alike, that they were 
aggressive acts of interference by anti-urban state legislatures. Notorious 
episodes of such meddling underscored the alienation and frustration of urban 
interests. 51 New York City, as George Plunkitt of Tammany Hall famously 
complained, was 
a city ruled entirely by the hayseed legislators at Albany. . . . We’ve got to eat 
and drink what they tell us to eat and drink, and have got to choose our time 
for eatin’ and drinkin’ to suit them. If they don’t feel like takin’ a glass of beer 
on Sunday, we must abstain. If they haven’t got any amusements in their 
backwoods, we musn’t have none. We’ve got to regulate our whole lives to 
suit them. And then we have to pay their taxes to boot.52 
The “deep-rooted evil” of state interference was all the more troubling in New 
York and many other settings, because rural-urban tensions were overlaid with 
sharp partisan distinctions between urban Democratic machines and “upstate” 
Republicans.53 This pattern “placed many of the cities on the plane of captured 
provinces,” as one reformer lamented, “to be exploited and bled for the benefit, 
not so much of the state itself, as in the interest of a particular political party 
which happened to control the legislature.”54 
While urban bosses and urban reformers joined ranks against state 
interference, they agreed on little else. For the latter, home rule was aimed 
simultaneously at meddling state legislatures and corrupt local political 
machines.55 The problem, as home rule champion Frank Goodnow put it 
succinctly in 1916, was that American cities were “unwisely, inefficiently, and 
extravagantly administered.”56 State interference, in his view, was yet another 
unfortunate consequence of boss rule, “due very largely to the despair of the 
people of our cities of ever obtaining good government through their own 
efforts. They have therefore rushed to the legislature for protection.”57 In most 
settings, home rule was pursued alongside parallel campaigns for “clean” 
government and managerial efficiency, including innovations such as 
 
 51. KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, supra note 45, at 11. Such meddling included the “ripper” laws 
of the mid-nineteenth century, which displaced local governance with state commissions. The 
imposition of a metropolitan police commission on New York City in 1857, for example, sparked 
days of rioting. See HOWARD MCBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 7 
(1916). 
 52. WILLIAM RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 21 (1963). 
 53. Id. 
 54. ARDNT, supra note 24, at 221; GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 233; MCBAIN, supra note 
51, at 64–101. 
 55. GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 17. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
 57. Id. at 8. 
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commission government, unified executive budgets, and merit-based civil 
service reform.58 
Indeed, viewed in the larger context of Gilded Age and Progressive urban 
reform, the home rule movement loses much of its luster. Careful examination 
of legislative “interference” suggests that states were actually quite deferential 
to urban interests; most special legislation was introduced by urban legislators, 
other legislators deferred to sponsors when such bills were referred to 
committee, committees routinely reported such bills to the floor where they 
were almost always passed, and neither state senates nor governors showed 
any inclination to second-guess house action. This was the case even in states, 
such as Plunkitt’s New York, that were marked by a partisan split between 
urban and rural interests.59 
The real object of home rule—like so many other facets of Progressive Era 
municipal reform—was simply to undermine the ability of urban bosses to 
mobilize or reward supporters.60 The core accomplishment of home rule, after 
all, was the ability of cities to charter their own governments, and reformers 
left little doubt as to what form that government should take.61 The point of 
home rule “is to give the cities of the state an opportunity to adopt what is 
termed the commission form of government,” as one contemporary noted, “the 
chief excellence of which is the concentration of municipal power into the 
hands of a few men or responsible agents, who are usually put at the head of 
the several departments necessary to the conduct of the business of cities.”62 
Home rule was a precondition less for popular sovereignty than for “business” 
management—a sentiment underscored by the collapse of urban political 
participation even as home rule and allied reforms promised to emancipate 
urban voters.63 
The home rule movement was a multifaceted campaign, pursued largely by 
academic reformers and “good government” municipal leagues, and was aimed 
at a variety of urban ills.64 This, as one reformer summarized the movement, 
was 
 
 58. Hays, supra note 30, at 157–69. 
 59. Scott Allard et al., Representing Urban Interests: The Local Politics of State 
Legislatures, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 276, 276–94 (1998); Eric Monkkonen, The Politics of 
Municipal Indebtedness and Default, 1850-1936, in THE POLITICS OF URBAN FISCAL POLICY 
125, 125–53 (Terrence McDonald & Sally Ward eds., 1984). 
 60. Hays, supra note 30, at 157–69. 
 61. James Weinstein, Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager 
Movements, 28 J. S. HIST. 166, 178 (1962). 
 62. Barnes v. City of Kirksville, 180 S.W. 545, 548 (1915). 
 63. Walter Dean Burnham, The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, 59 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 7, 22 (1965) (discussing a classic account of home rule); see also Hays, supra note 
30, at 6–38. 
 64. Cumfer, supra note 38, at 924–28. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
60 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:51 
 
an effort to make our cities free and relieve them of the necessity of jockeying 
at the state capitols for special local legislation, as well as rendering them 
immune from legislative attack or interference . . . as well as ridding 
themselves of local dictators with power built up by intrigue, chicane, and 
political patronage without regard to public justice or a business administration 
of municipal affairs. . . . The central thought of the home rule city is that it 
shall be governed by men who work, and whose ideals become its soul and 
guiding light. Its moving epic is a reincarnation of the spirit of the burghers of 
Florence; a new renaissance in American municipal life.65 
Home rulers fought for the city’s status as a “state within a state” in such a way 
as to both carve out a clear set of municipal responsibilities and erect barriers 
to state interference or preemption.66 
The goals and pace of the home rule challenge to Dillon’s Rule varied 
widely across the country, and as the movement progressed through the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first, and most common, home 
rule victory was a prohibition of state meddling through “special” legislation.67 
Most midwestern and western state constitutions adopted after the mid-
nineteenth century included such provisions.68 Such constraints on state power, 
however, meant little if they were not accompanied by the devolution of some 
political responsibility to the cities themselves.69 The first goal, in this respect, 
was local control over the structure and administration of local government, a 
right first won in Missouri in 1875, followed by California in 1879, 
Washington in 1889, Minnesota in 1896, and a flurry of states in the long 
decade before World War I.70 The progress of home rule slowed, in part 
because the Supreme Court reaffirmed Dillon’s Rule in 1923, and in part 
because the Depression pushed the constitutional question of federal power to 
the forefront. Yet eight more states established or elaborated home rule 
provisions between the wars,71 a few more states joined the roster after 1945, 
and many others expanded earlier laws—dropping population thresholds, 
 
 65. WILLIAM K. CLUTE, THE LAW OF MODERN MUNICIPAL CHARTERS 123 (Fred. S. Drake 
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enumerating new municipal powers, and extending home rule to counties as 
well.72 
By the end of the twentieth century, forty-five states allowed some form of 
home rule and about thirty states granted substantive structural, political, and 
fiscal responsibility to local governments.73 Generally, home rule powers were 
most expansive through the West and upper Midwest and weakest in the South 
and Northeast.74 The movement never fully succeeded in overthrowing 
Dillon’s Rule, and in most states local powers must still be expressly granted 
by state law.75 But by the same token, most incorporated municipalities can, 
within broad limits set by state law, shape their own charters, enter into 
contracts, tax local residents, go into debt, zone and annex land, and provide a 
broad range of local services.76 
III.  THE HIGH PRICE OF HOME RULE IN GREATER ST. LOUIS 
In most settings, home rule was pursued and won for an idealized city—a 
sort of Florentine or Roman city-state representing a diverse economic and 
demographic base, a metropolitan anchor for a larger region, and a “more or 
less natural unit of government.”77 But cities changed. As home rule ceded 
greater authority to local governments, it also made it possible for fragments of 
the metropolis to incorporate their own governments. The result was not just 
cities with some autonomy from state rule, but also proliferating suburbs with 
autonomy from the central city and from each other.78 While the nation’s 
metropolitan areas79 number in the hundreds, there are, by the last Census of 
Governments, nearly 39,000 local general-purpose governments and another 
51,000 special-purpose governments.80 The modern city represents anything 
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University Press ed., 1918). 
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but a “natural unit of government.” Today, metropolitan St. Louis consists of 
17 counties, 309 municipalities or census-designated places, and 165 school 
districts.81 
With the advent of home rule, state and local law regarding incorporation, 
annexation, and consolidation varied wildly, but in most settings made it much 
easier to incorporate new localities on the city’s fringes. “By the early 
twentieth century suburbanites had begun carving up the metropolis,” the 
urban historian Jon Teaford concludes, “and the states had handed them the 
knife.”82 Nowhere was this truer than in Greater St. Louis.83 St. Louis County 
claimed six incorporated municipalities in 1900 and only twelve more by 
1930—but that number had more than doubled by 1940 and doubled again by 
1950.84 During this era, most new housing stock was erected in unincorporated 
subdivisions.85 The character of these suburbs was determined by the terms 
and standards of private construction and realty, including house and lot size 
and deed restrictions.86 Residents sought incorporation as a means of 
sustaining local standards. Professional planners, for their part, routinely 
discouraged their St. Louis County clients from annexing new territory. 
Instead, they argued that smaller municipal units were sufficient to provide 
local services and necessary to avoid the threats posed by mixed density or 
use.87 The result, noted as early as the late 1920s, was a “considerable number 
of small communities,” each “separate from the metropolitan city and . . . aloof 
from its neighbor.”88 It bears repeating: today’s metropolitan St. Louis consists 
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of 17 counties, 309 municipalities or census-designated places, and 165 school 
districts.89 
It was not, of course, the mere fact of this fragmentation that caused the 
damage, but what the proliferation of local governments did with their power. 
What has played out in St. Louis, and in many other settings, is an object 
lesson in the perils and costs of local power. When a city is governed by a 
patchwork of insular corporate units that are uneven in size, capacity, and 
composition, the fruits of local growth will accumulate in a small subset of 
affluent localities.90 Patterns of economic and racial segregation will harden 
over time.91 Civic participation and public good will suffer.92 And all of this 
will come at the expense of the greater metropolis, where the aggregate costs 
of petty localism vastly outweigh the scattered local benefits.93 
First and foremost, home rule nurtured segregation.94 The early twentieth-
century city was a natural unit of diverse and densely interrelated populations 
and economic activities, as “bustling streets with a mixture of factories, 
offices, apartments and homes crowded together amidst heavy traffic, noise, 
dirt, and excitement.”95 By the middle of the twentieth century, these same 
cities were defined and shaped by lines of incorporation that separated the 
offices and factories from the homes, and the homes from the apartments.96 As 
independently incorporated suburbs segregated residential and commercial 
development, they increasingly viewed local government not as a means of 
managing the city, but as a protector of “hearth and home” against the threats 
posed by the city.97 
Local segregation was deepened and subsidized by state and federal policy. 
During its heyday from the late 1930s through the late 1950s, the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) wedded its mortgage guarantee programs to an 
elaborate system of rating prospective borrowers, properties, and 
neighborhoods.98 In St. Louis and elsewhere, FHA policies assumed that stable 
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housing values required that neighborhoods “be occupied by the same racial 
and social classes” and pushed investment away from the “crowded 
neighborhoods” and “older properties” of the central cities.99 
These underwriting standards—which the FHA borrowed whole hog from 
the real estate industry—also shaped local control over land zoning.100 
Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, exclusionary zoning101 
was allowed only on the basis of public health, public safety, or public morals. 
Courts consistently held that zoning could not be used to sustain property 
values or the qualities of certain neighborhoods.102 But as home rule 
encouraged fragmented incorporation, states ceded zoning authority to local 
governments, and emerging suburbs sought to protect “community standards,” 
exclusionary zoning became a much more potent tool.103 Such exclusionary 
zoning practices include minimum lot size, minimum dwelling size, and 
restrictions on, or outright prohibitions of, manufactured or multifamily 
housing.104 These practices were pioneered, in many respects, by the FHA’s 
desire to sustain “the character of the community” in early postwar 
developments.105 
In the St. Louis suburbs, zoning was routinely and candidly viewed as a 
mechanism for sorting the metropolitan population by race and income, and for 
sustaining the spirit of race-restrictive deed covenants past their expiration.106 
The direct examples here are telling. The City of Berkeley in St. Louis County 
grew out of a dispute over school district boundaries with neighboring 
Kinloch—the lone black enclave in the County.107 When white residents failed 
to sustain school segregation by dividing the school district, they created a new 
town in 1937 instead.108 The City of Black Jack was hastily formed in 1970 to 
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stave off a mixed-income housing project.109 The sprawling West County 
municipality of Wildwood (incorporated in 1995) was driven largely by fears 
that St. Louis County was not willing to sustain large-lot single-family 
residential development.110 
Segregation and fragmented governance, in turn, created enduring fiscal 
dilemmas. Cities lost the taxing power to match their responsibilities, while 
suburbs were able to build a lucrative tax base while evading many of those 
responsibilities.111 Central cities have always borne a disproportionate share of 
broad “metropolitan” services—such as airports, libraries, zoos, museums, 
parks, or hospitals—while suburban localities provide a more modest range of 
services on a much more stable tax base.112 At the same time, suburbs are able 
to duck many of the costs of suburbanization itself.113 Some of the slack is 
picked up by the state or counties, but often in such a way as to place even 
greater tax burdens on inner city residents.114 Perhaps most importantly, home 
rule, along with its fragmented tax base, tends to cement or exaggerate 
interlocal differences in wealth and tax-funded services—especially public 
education.115 While a rash of “equal protection” lawsuits have compelled states 
to step in and even out some of this disparity, home rule—and its 
consequences for poorer students—remains the organizing principle of school 
governance and finance.116 Indeed courts have generally held that local control 
over school finance is a logical corollary to the broader assumption that local 
government is an extension of parental control and familial interests.117 
Historically, such fiscal challenges are only exacerbated by efforts to 
overcome them through urban renewal or local economic development 
policies.118 Despite the attention paid to corporate trophy hunting at the state 
level, the practice of offering lucrative tax incentives or subsidies to 
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prospective investors is largely a local phenomenon.119 Indeed the vast 
majority of such subsidized relocations occur not across state lines but within a 
state or metropolitan region.120 Municipalities, often drawing on the same pot 
of state money for “community development,” compete frantically for 
commercial investment.121 Local governments are, by nature, more susceptible 
to the influence of powerful corporate interests.122 These corporate interests 
routinely pit communities against one and other, making cities less likely to 
consider the broader regional impact of business relocation.123 The result, now 
widely documented, is a largely irrational scramble for business investment.124 
In their eagerness to pad the tax base for the long run, local governments will 
defer tax collection or target tax expenditures for the short run—often ten or 
twenty or thirty years.125 In their eagerness to cut a better deal than competing 
cities, local governments will avoid attaching strings, such as wage or job 
retention guarantees, to development assistance unless local or state law 
compels them to do so.126 Cities routinely forgo tax collections or pay 
subsidies that buy little more than “business confidence.”127 
In St. Louis, this local competition is exaggerated by the stakes—Missouri 
municipalities can choose to keep sales taxes generated locally128—and by the 
stark underlying geography of local inequality. Fragmented local governance 
has meant, among other things, that economic change will be borne unequally. 
Deindustrialization, automobility, and the emergence of a service and 
knowledge economy brought with them winners and losers. In St. Louis, of 
course, the old economy lay mostly to the east of Skinker Boulevard, and the 
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new economy mostly to the west.129 Urban renewal and economic development 
policies, in this context, tended to harden local segregation, erode fiscal 
capacity where it is needed most, and widen the gap between the City of St. 
Louis and its suburbs.130 
IV.  UNDOING THE DAMAGE? 
Urban historians and urban scholars generally agree that patchwork 
governance has been disastrous for American cities.131 Home rule has 
encouraged local piracy, cemented local inequalities, and frustrated any 
broader or regional response. Local interests grasped this as well.132 The ink 
was scarcely dry on the 1876 accord splitting the City and the County when the 
former discovered that it would bear most of the costs and reap little of the 
benefit of home rule.133 And even the County, while unwilling to reconsider its 
divorce from the City, struggled with the costs and confusion of municipal 
proliferation within its borders.134 Fair housing advocates identified municipal 
fragmentation—and the policies that flowed from it—as an engine of local 
segregation.135 And business interests and groups came to realize that 
fragmented policy and planning turned growth politics into a local game of 
musical chairs.136 For these reasons, the region has monotonously, although 
never successfully, revisited the question of stitching the City and the County 
back together again.137 In the early 1920s, in the wake of Progressive Era 
fascination with “business-minded” managerial efficiency in local government, 
a board of freeholders138 laid out a range of options for regional 
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consolidation—including a return of St. Louis City to St. Louis County, 
annexation of part of the County by the City, annexation of the entire County 
by the City, and establishment of “special districts” for certain metropolitan 
services.139 County opposition torpedoed the proposal, and reformers led by 
the chamber of commerce regrouped around a “federal” plan that would 
maintain existing municipalities but create a new regional government with 
responsibility for health, sewers, public utilities, libraries, parks, and city 
planning.140 This option was defeated in a statewide vote in 1930.141 
After 1930, the federal or regional option proceeded in fits and starts, 
yielding the creation of the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, which 
encompassed the City and the Missouri suburbs in the Mississippi watershed, 
in 1954, a junior college district in 1962, and a zoo-museum district in 1971.142 
Despite a near consensus that transportation (public and highways) posed the 
greatest regional planning challenge, the idea of a special transit district stalled, 
leaving only the Bi-State Development Agency, a combination planning body 
and bridge/harbor authority without any taxing power.143 The chamber of 
commerce and others continued to promote some form of regional government 
and underwrote an exhaustive “Metropolitan St. Louis Survey” in 1955, which 
suggested a new metropolitan government with responsibility for arterial 
roads, transit, planning, economic development, sewers, civil defense, police, 
and property assessment.144 
Again, regional solutions could not run the gauntlet of the joint St. Louis 
City-County Board of Freeholders, which split fairly predictably along City-
County lines and settled on a weak compromise.145 This pleased no one. 
County interests remained leery of any threat to home rule. City interests saw 
little benefit in half measures.146 African Americans on the City’s north side 
feared losing what little clout they claimed. Not surprisingly, the plan was 
easily defeated in a 1959 special election, losing by a margin of 2–1 in the City 
and 3–1 in the County.147 
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This brings us back to the 1962 “Borough Plan,” the last serious stab at 
overcoming regional fragmentation and its ills.148 Like previous efforts, the 
Borough Plan proposed a sort of federal solution: an umbrella regional 
government assuming most core metropolitan responsibilities and twenty-two 
local boroughs, which would provide local representation and a shadow of 
home rule.149 Proponents once again voiced their disdain for the region’s 
“hodge-podge of feeble, self-centered, conflicting governments” and the 
“crazy-quilt of extravagant burdening and unneeded tax bodies.”150 Critics, 
especially in the County’s suburbs and in the City’s African American wards, 
countered that the Borough Plan was being “forced down the throats of the 
people of St. Louis and St. Louis County” and that it was all little more than “a 
clever attempt to delude the people of the area, particularly those in St. Louis 
County, into believing that their local communities will actually remain in 
existence.”151 The proposal lost handily, by a near 4–1 margin, in the statewide 
vote.152 
After 1962, the “beggar-thy-neighbor” logic of home rule and the urgency 
of regional solutions persisted, but serious political reforms were rarely 
broached. Local governments toyed with a regional council.153 Local growth 
interests, most prominently Civic Progress and the City and County chambers 
of commerce (merged and recast as the St. Louis Regional Chamber and 
Growth Association in 1973), continued to lament the costs and inefficiencies 
of local fragmentation.154 But, as Civic Progress concluded glumly in 1969, the 
combined opposition of suburban interests and the City’s African American 
wards left “little or no chance of major governmental consolidation.”155 Even 
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St. Louis County, fearing that municipal incorporation and annexations would 
leave it with little but substandard housing, farms, and floodplains on its tax 
rolls, floated a number of proposals for municipal reorganization and new 
County authority over land use and zoning.156 The County, however, could not 
overcome the entrenched defense of fragmented home rule.157 
The regional perspective was, and is, sustained by organizations like the 
East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (now the East-West Gateway 
Council of Governments),158 Confluence (now FOCUS) St. Louis, and the 
Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Opportunity Council.159 But the 
willingness and ability of these organizations to document the consequences of 
political fragmentation were not matched by their capacity to implement 
lasting solutions. The actual governance of the metropolis, claimed fleetingly 
by the City of St. Louis in 1876, remains largely in the hands of hundreds of 
suburban corporate fragments, most of which exist and legislate in order to 
keep the City, its problems, and its costs at bay. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is a stark and sustained mismatch between the natural economic and 
demographic scope of American cities, and the crazy quilt of governments that 
furnish public goods and public services to their residents. Such governmental 
fragmentation is suspect on efficiency grounds alone, as local services—and 
the means to pay for them—are replicated in incorporated units that are, in 
scope and timing, largely accidents of local development patterns and policies. 
More importantly, patchwork governance cements and sustains local 
inequalities in such a way that local services—and the means to pay for 
them—vary dramatically across the metropolitan region. These political units, 
numbering in the hundreds in many settings, have distinct economic and 
demographic profiles, and dramatically uneven economic assets and fiscal 
capacities. Those that come out ahead in all of this, or hope to, pursue policies 
that harden such inequalities. Those that fall behind—especially the older, 
central cities—can do little but watch. 
In St. Louis, this local fragmentation played out in a particularly damaging 
fashion. As an older industrial river city, St. Louis lacked the economic growth 
or diversity of many of its peers. Deindustrialization hit hard and early, and the 
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losers outnumbered the winners. As a border city, St. Louis was also a starkly 
racial setting, its development marked by a sustained and elaborate pattern of 
local segregation by private and public means. And as a Missouri city, St. 
Louis faced few legal or regulatory constraints on sprawl. All of this meant 
that local factions had both the incentive and the ability to engage in over a 
century of intense and unequal competition to hoard the region’s assets and 
avoid its liabilities. 
The recognition that this political fragmentation was destructive came 
early to St. Louis planners and politicians, as even the urban champions of the 
1876 accord splitting St. Louis and St. Louis County soon claimed buyer’s 
remorse. But successive stabs at reform, each more urgent than the last, have 
hardly left a mark. Truly metropolitan or regional solutions remained elusive. 
In part, this is because our cities and municipalities are political 
afterthoughts—their power of home rule reluctantly ceded by state legislatures. 
They have just enough local discretion over land use and planning to beggar 
their neighbors, but not means or incentive to cooperate with them. And in part 
this is because, as the region’s problems worsened and spilled from the central 
city into the inner suburbs, the stakes just got higher. Regional cooperation 
became more urgent and yet more elusive with each passing decade. 
